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 derek s.  hoff 
 “Kick That Population Commission in 
the Ass”: The Nixon Administration, the 
Commission on Population Growth and 
the American Future, and the Defusing of 
the Population Bomb 
 Postwar America was fertile ground for a resurgent Malthusianism. Between 
1900 and 1960, the world’s population doubled, and aft er World War II, a 
growing cadre of social scientists expressed grave concern that the planet 
might not withstand another doubling, in a mere thirty years. Especially in 
the late 1960s—as mass environmentalism emerged, the U.S. population 
crossed the 200-million mark, global population growth rates peaked, and 
India endured drought and famine—an American Malthusianism that had 
been percolating since the late 1940s simmered to the surface. 1 Now infused 
with an ecological sensibility, this doomsday population discourse empha-
sized pollution and the prospect of environmental collapse more than simply 
the supply of natural resources and food (the dominant paradigm since the 
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British pastor Th omas Malthus’s 1798  Essay on Human Population ). 2 Th e natural 
scientists, birth-control advocates, foundation offi  cials, and radical economists 
who shaped this postwar Malthusianism generally assumed that the devel-
oping world faced the most urgent population problems. However, most of 
these experts also insisted that every nation faced population-induced crises 
in the long run. 3 Th e Stanford biologist Paul Ehrlich expressed this viewpoint 
in the most famous population treatise since Malthus— Th e Population Bomb 
(1968)—sparking the organized “zero population growth” movement in the 
United States. 4 
 To some degree, the U.S. government had incorporated Malthusian 
concerns ever since the Truman administration’s “Point Four” foreign aid 
program, which assumed that population-growth-induced resource scarcity 
bred communism. But state action came haltingly. Neither President Eisen-
hower nor Kennedy believed that direct action to combat population growth, 
whether domestic or international, fell within the proper purview of govern-
ment policy. President Johnson spoke forcefully about what he saw as the 
global population crisis; and his administration promoted the inclusion of 
family planning training and education in overseas USAID programs and, 
most dramatically, made food aid to India dependent on progress on the pop-
ulation front. 5 Moreover, the Johnson administration launched federally 
sponsored family planning programs as part of its War on Poverty. Still, Johnson 
never seriously considered assertive policies to decelerate domestic popula-
tion growth, and his administration stalled on even the modest proposal of 
creating a national commission to study population issues. 6 
 From 1969 to 1972, however, disparate actors in the federal government 
embraced the new Malthusianism and elevated the population-policy debate 
far beyond the birth-control programs that had emerged in the mid-1960s. 
Cresting concerns about overpopulation among the general public and expert 
frustration that global population growth rates were unaff ected by two 
decades of accelerated family planning aid had combined to create a sense 
that the moment had arrived to move “beyond family planning.” 7 Lawmakers 
sympathetic to the population movement now considered not merely man-
aging domestic population growth and its supposed consequences (for example, 
by stepping up environmental protection), but intervening comprehensively 
to “control” this growth. Americans’ faith in liberal individualism and puri-
tanical resistance to public debate about sex and reproduction prevented dra-
conian measures, such as capping the allowable number of children per family. 
Nonetheless, the state had several tools at its disposal, including creating tax 
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disincentives for large families and early marriage, legalizing abortion, dra-
matically increasing access to family planning, and reducing immigration. 
 Th e Nixon administration initially jumped on the population band-
wagon. In a special 1969 message on population draft ed by his urban aff airs 
adviser Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the president framed the issue in both for-
eign and domestic terms, calling population growth “one of the most serious 
challenges to human destiny in the last third of this century.” 8 At Nixon’s 
urging, Congress created the Commission on Population Growth and the 
American Future, chaired by philanthropist and leading Malthusian John 
D. Rockefeller III, to investigate all facets of the population problem. Th e com-
mission’s fi nal report, issued in 1972, called for a series of policies designed to 
encourage population stabilization. 9 
 Yet even before the commission’s report, the “overpopulation” critique 
was rapidly exiting stage right from the administration. Th en Nixon all but 
ended the possibility of state intervention to slow population growth when he 
perfunctorily thanked the commission for its labors but rejected its fi nal 
report. Behind the scenes, his administration ensured that the commission’s 
recommendations never saw the legislative light of day. 
 Th e events surrounding the ineff ectual population commission are worth 
studying in their own right as a window into policymaking in the Nixon 
White House. More broadly, this essay examines a crucial moment in the 
centuries-old debate about population, natural resources, and the economy 
that recent global energy, food, and climate crises have spotlighted once 
again. In particular, these pages illuminate the emergence of a new political 
economy of population in the United States—a widespread embrace of popu-
lation growth that survives to this day. It is true that some anxiety about pop-
ulation growth remained in the 1970s, when talk of a “zero-sum society” 
thrived, some liberals questioned the virtue of “growth,” broadly defi ned, and 
oil fl owed less freely. By any measure, however, unease with “overpopulation”—
especially domestic U.S. overpopulation—dwindled dramatically aft er 1972 
among policymakers, journalists, and the general public. 10 Indeed, by the late 
1970s, most policymakers had traded in overpopulation fears for an unabashed 
embrace of steady population growth, at least in regard to American demo-
graphic trends. Th is article thus explores the major reversal in the modern 
U.S. population debate from prevailing skepticism to prevailing optimism 
about population growth. 
 Moreover, the pages below demonstrate the connection between this 
reversal and the broader revival of laissez-faire economic ideas that domi-
nated the American political economy in the fi nal third of the twentieth century. 
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Put another way, new optimism about the benefi ts of population growth not 
only responded to but also contributed to the resurgence of conservative 
political economy. More specifi cally, as I examine the course of the popula-
tion issue in the Nixon White House within the context of shift ing social 
science expertise, I argue that two developments drove the turnaround in the 
American population debate. First, the Nixon administration helped defuse 
the “population bomb”: it narrowed the scope of the overpopulation critique 
by concentrating on the shibboleth of potentially altering the geographic 
distribution of Americans rather than on the possibility of addressing aggregate 
growth. In doing so, President Nixon came to reject the goal of zero popula-
tion growth. In part, this refutation simply revealed an instinctual defense of 
economic growth, given that some in the population-control movement 
called for a radical brake on economic activity. However, the administration’s 
dismissal of an overpopulation problem also refl ected the second develop-
ment that spurred an about-face in population thought: the ascendancy of a 
new pro-population-growth economics that had been building momentum 
among social scientists since the early 1960s. 
 My account challenges the conventional wisdom on the demise of the 
domestic overpopulation critique. (Th e story told in these pages is explicitly 
a domestic one, and the reader should bear in mind that the discussion about 
population growth in the United States took place against the backdrop of 
continued eff orts by both the U.S. government and the philanthropic sector 
to reduce birthrates in the “developing” nations.) 11 Th e small literature that 
addresses the waning of 1960s Malthusianism, led by Donald Critchlow’s ex-
cellent history of family planning and abortion policy and an article in this 
journal, Roy Beck and Leon Kolankiewicz’s “Th e Environmental Movement’s 
Retreat from Advocating U.S. Population Stabilization,” emphasizes two main 
factors during the Nixon years. 12 Th e fi rst is shift ing demographic fundamentals: 
the clamor for population control took place during a unique interregnum 
when a signifi cant slowdown in U.S. aggregate population growth seemed 
possible. Th e birthrate of American women declined from 1960 to 1967, briefl y 
increased in 1968 and 1969, and then dropped again from 1970 to 1972, slipping 
below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. Th is declining birthrate, 
scholars reasonably conclude, undercut calls for population control. 13 Moreover, 
the dramatic and surprising rise in immigration that followed the 1965 Immi-
gration Act was just gathering steam; it was not clear during the late 1960s 
that immigration would increase to the dramatic extent that it has since then. 
Second, existing accounts emphasize how the population issue was sucked 
into the vortex of America’s “culture wars.” In this interpretation, the new 
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battle over abortion rights was paramount, both for politicizing the popula-
tion issue and for creating an organized constituency (the “pro-life” movement) 
that considered birth control and population control anathema. 14 
 In accounting for the trajectory of the population issue in recent decades, 
the demographic and cultural analyses illuminate much of the story but are 
insuffi  cient. To begin with, the role of the declining birthrate in reducing con-
cern about overpopulation has been exaggerated. Many demographers, law-
makers, and the Nixon administration predicted that birthrate declines would 
be short-lived and that a new Baby Boom was just around the corner. 15 And 
in any event, most participants in the debate were not surprised that the 
birthrate was decreasing; they knew that populations cannot grow indefi -
nitely. Even population alarmists had long conceded that, the Baby Boom 
aside, American fertility was likely to resume its historic pattern of decline. 16 
Th e question was never whether the U.S. (or world) population would stabi-
lize but at what level, when, and at what cost along the way. Th e “culture wars” 
argument is also important. As we will see, Nixon distanced himself from the 
report of his population commission in part because he opposed its advocacy 
of legalized abortion and was mindful of criticism from the Catholic Church. 
Moreover, a stepped-up battle over immigration during the 1970s reinforced 
the politicization of the population growth issue and, as Beck and Kolankiewicz 
suggest, drove many environmentalists away from the population issue out 
of fear of being branded anti-immigrant and racist. 
 However, the scholarly stress on cultural fi ssures slights the vital role that 
broader shift s in economic ideas played in remaking the American population 
debate—before the culture wars entirely engulfed it. Most accounts of the rise 
and fall of the overpopulation issue focus on the 1970s, when the transition was 
most evident, and thus miss the critical developments of the 1960s. Th at decade 
witnessed the emergence of a conservative critique of Malthusianism and a 
concomitant veneration of population growth. Historians have not yet explored 
in detail the evolution of conservative ideas regarding demographic expansion 
in the United States, but they were paramount to the vanishing anxiety about 
“overpopulation.” As with so much of what took place in 1960s America, a 
veneer of liberal success on the population issue temporarily masked a 
budding and ultimately even more successful conservative response. 
 nixon’s brief bout of malthusianism 
 Th e election of Richard Nixon was initially unsettling to advocates of popula-
tion control; notwithstanding the mention in the GOP’s 1968 platform of the 
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“menace” of the “world-wide population explosion,” his views on these matters 
were inchoate. 17 However, Nixon assumed the presidency as popular and media 
concern about “overpopulation” crested, and his initial response was in step with 
the public’s mood. In his 1969 message on population, in which he called for a 
commission, Nixon stated, “I believe that many of our present social problems 
may be related to the fact that we have had only fi ft y years in which to accommo-
date the second hundred million Americans.” 18 Th e president predicted that the 
additional 100 million people expected by the end of the twentieth century 
would cause further economic and social strains. Nixon indicated elsewhere that 
he was serious about combating international population growth, 19 and neither 
government offi  cials nor the press saw any reason to doubt his commitment. 20 
 At this juncture, four factors had tipped the scales in the administration 
in favor of population alarmism. Most obviously, popular apprehension was 
peaking. Second, the congressional movement for population control 
remained bipartisan and vibrant. The late 1960s saw the introduction of 
dozens of pieces of family-planning legislation, and although several con-
gressional Malthusians were Republican (e.g., Rep. George H. W. Bush), 21 the 
White House wanted to “seize the initiative” from Democratic leaders. 22 
Th ird, the population establishment, and especially the Population Council 
(founded by John D. Rockefeller III in 1952, and still an important organiza-
tion today), continued to highlight what it saw as the overpopulation prob-
lem and to lobby aggressively for federal spending on family planning 
programs and population education. Th e Republican Rockefeller enjoyed 
good contacts with several members of the administration friendly to family 
planning. 23 Fourth, the Cold War sustained the notion that the United States 
had to put its own population house in order as an example to Th ird World 
nations. For instance, Donald Rumsfeld, who headed Nixon’s Offi  ce of Economic 
Opportunity before becoming his counselor, noted that Nixon and his three 
predecessors had all supported eff orts at easing overseas population growth 
for national security reasons. Rumsfeld eventually testifi ed to the commis-
sion that “the credibility of this [presidential] support hinges in part upon the 
degree of responsibility we in the United States display in population aff airs 
here at home.” 24 Commenting on the landmark population legislation of the 
Nixon era—the 1970 Family Planning Services and Population Research Act, 
which greatly extended federal support for birth control programs—the  New 
York Times concluded: “Perhaps most important of all, the family planning 
bill demonstrates to a sometimes skeptical international public that the 
United States intends to practice at home what it has been preaching to the 
world with increasing urgency in recent years.” 25 
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 A vocal minority in Congress promoted even more aggressive popula-
tion policies. In 1970, for example, Senator Joseph Tydings (D-Md.), one of 
the issue leaders since the mid-1960s and a sponsor of the Family Planning 
Services and Population Research Act, introduced a joint resolution declaring 
it to be the offi  cial policy of the federal government to “develop, encourage, 
and implement, at the earliest possible time, the necessary policies, attitudes, 
social standards and actions which will, by voluntary means consistent with 
human rights and individual conscience, stabilize the population of the U.S. 
and thereby promote the future well-being of this nation and the entire 
world.” 26 Th at same year, Senator Bob Packwood (D-Ore.) and Representative 
Pete McCloskey Jr. (R-Calif.) introduced bills to eliminate tax deductions for 
all but the fi rst two children. 27 
 But the policy window was not that wide. Most lawmakers were content 
to merely study the population issue, and in 1970 they turned their attention 
to perhaps the most famous—or infamous—legacy of the population issue 
during the Nixon years: the Commission on Population Growth and the 
American Future. 28 Nixon’s point person on population was his domestic 
policy adviser Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the maverick Democrat (and future 
senator) who had written the well-known “Moynihan Report” on the African 
American family in Kennedy’s Department of Labor. Moynihan was the main 
author of Nixon’s population message, 29 and in 1969 he steered the commission’s 
enabling legislation through Congress. 30 
 Th e legislation did not clarify whether the commission was charged with 
recommending policies simply to adjust American society to population 
increase or in fact to slow down this increase. House amendments pointed 
the commission in a more radical direction, but Nixon’s population message—
and his advisers—predominantly thought in terms of planning for popula-
tion increase rather than arresting it. 31 Moynihan, for example, advised the 
president that “the fi rst function of the Commission is to chart the expected 
growth of the population between now and the year 2000 in terms of numbers 
and location, and the resources of the public sector that will be required to 
deal with this anticipated growth.” 32 Indeed, Moynihan revealed his techno-
cratic approach to the issue at a press conference on June 4, 1970. Here he told 
reporters, “By and large, the average cat food company knows more about the 
demographic structure of the American public and what it is likely to be than 
does the city of Chicago. We don’t have any forward thinking this way and we are 
trying to build it into our concerns, medicine and aging and things like that.” 33 
At the other end of the spectrum, advocates of population reduction bemoaned 
what they saw as the commission’s narrow mission. 34 Representative Morris 
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Udall (D-Ariz.), among others, complained about the “implied assumption that 
these other 100 million Americans, this additional population, is inevitable, 
that we simply accept it and begin to plan for how we are going to take care of 
it. I don’t think we ask the ultimate question if we make that assumption.” 35 
Udall also introduced more forceful legislation that would have made popu-
lation stabilization the offi  cial policy of the United States, but it received only 
perfunctory debate. 36 
 During the fi rst half of 1970, a small group within the administration led 
by Moynihan selected the commission’s members. 37 Th e process quickly 
became politicized, and in June an exasperated Moynihan complained to John 
Ehrlichman (the Assistant to the President for Domestic Aff airs), “With any 
luck we may yet appoint a Population Commission. Th at is, aft er the FBI has 
gone through its pathetic inquiries into the prospect that a Negro doctor had 
an Aunt whose girlfriend slept with a Communist.” 38 In addition to Senator 
Tydings and three other members of Congress, all of whom were deeply con-
cerned with population growth, 39 the commission included a politically cor-
rect mix of representatives from various interest groups. 40 “Politically,” its 
research director concluded, “the group was conservative by college student 
standards, liberal by national and White House standards. By no stretch of the 
imagination could the group be characterized as radical.” 41 Moynihan’s fi rst 
choice for chair was William Scranton, the former governor of Pennsylvania 
whom liberal Republicans had draft ed in 1964 to unsuccessfully challenge 
Barry Goldwater (at the time he was a vice chairman of the Urban Institute), 
but Moynihan also approved of the fi nal selection of John D. Rockefeller. 42 
 In March 1971, the commission’s interim report used safe language—and a 
common moderate critique of population growth rooted in aesthetic (rather 
than scarcity) concerns—to warn against the dangers of continual population 
increase. Rather than sounding the resource-exhaustion alarm, that is, this report 
maintained that population growth acted “as an intensifi er or multiplier of many 
problems impairing the quality of life in the United States.” 43 As the Commission 
on Population Growth and the American Future gathered steam, the Nixon 
administration began to pull away from even this moderate, quality-of-life-
centered response to the population question, setting the stage for a collision. 
 the urban crisis and “balanced growth” 
 As Donald Critchlow has shown, the development of a contentious abortion 
politics in the United States goes far in explaining the eventual dénouement 
of the Malthusian moment. 44 Individuals who today would be called “cultural 
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conservatives” increasingly rejected the zero population growth movement, 
seeing it, correctly, as tied to the movement to legalize abortion. 45 And the 
abortion-related backlash against population policy fi ltered into the White 
House. In April 1971, Nixon issued an order insisting that military bases 
follow state abortion laws, declaring that abortion was an “unacceptable form 
of population control.” 46 Yet abortion was just one of several issues that 
reshaped population politics. Before a showdown over abortion at the very 
end of the commission’s life, the White House had reduced the urgency of the 
zero population growth critique by thinking about population problems pri-
marily in terms of controversial social-demographic issues surrounding the 
American city (and not, therefore, in terms of aggregate population growth). 
 On one level, the conceptual links between the population and urban 
debates were poverty and social decay. During the mid-1960s, and especially 
aft er the Watts uprising in Los Angeles, a so-called urban-crisis captured 
policymakers’ imaginations. Th e population debate overlapped with this 
(racialized) urban crisis because several hot-button social issues with demo-
graphic overtones (for example, rising teenage pregnancy) were seen pri-
marily as urban problems. Th e purported connection between population 
growth and the urban crisis, therefore, injected a fresh dose of racial politics 
into a population discussion already tainted and racialized via the unfortu-
nate legacy of eugenics. 47 
 On another level, however, the population and urban debates linked 
through the paradigm of controlling “growth.” Because urban and suburban 
growth accounted for most of the overall population growth in 1960s America 
(as they did throughout the twentieth century), population controllers and 
urban planners shared overlapping goals. The former wanted to reduce 
aggregate population growth, and the latter sought a national growth policy 
that would reduce urban densities or at least induce “balanced growth” 
between the city, suburb, and countryside. 
 Within a Nixon White House engaged in the quest for a national urban 
policy, the question “Where shall they live?” subsumed the question “How 
many of them shall there be?” In other words, the administration stressed the 
geographic distribution of the population—in particular, the increasing con-
centration of Americans in and around major cities—rather than aggregate 
growth. Th at the administration thought about population primarily in terms 
of geographic location was revealed in a June 1971 meeting of Nixon’s Domes-
tic Council. John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s domestic policy chief, scribbled two 
notes under the agenda heading of “population” for this meeting: “what 
growth among poor” and “ where will growth be in U.S.” 48 
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 Because of the historical racialization of poverty discourse in the United 
States, critics of the administration and of the population movement dis-
missed the population–urban crisis link as race baiting (even though the anx-
iety about “growth among the poor” was always expressed in race-neutral 
terms). Moreover, given that one interpretation of Nixon labels him “Tricky 
Dick”—a clever schemer who undermined policy goals by publicly endorsing 
them while simultaneously letting his henchmen destroy them—it is tempting 
to surmise that the administration’s emphasis on population location was a 
clever way of dooming the population issue through controversy, even as it 
scored short-term political gains. 49 However, the emphasis on the question 
“Where will they live?” should be seen against the backdrop of not only the 
urban crisis but also of a broad bipartisan movement to develop a compre-
hensive “growth policy” for the United States. 
 Th e quest for a national growth policy fused demographic and environ-
mental planning; proposals for government-induced population redistribu-
tion refl ected a long-standing belief that more effi  cient distribution of the 
U.S. population would protect the land. 50 More specifi cally, “growth policy” 
in the 1960s implied measures to minimize the damage to landscapes that 
resulted from the nation’s explosive postwar economic growth (and from the 
localized nature of land-use planning). Advocates of a national growth policy 
acknowledged the sheer growth of the aggregate population, but their pri-
mary concern was the deleterious eff ects of distribution, for example the 
“sprawl” created by the expanding megalopolises concentrated along the 
Atlantic and Pacifi c coasts. 51 Hence, many proposals for a national growth 
policy included eff orts to subsidize population relocation. 52 Th e campaign for 
growth policy united liberals, who opposed the ecological eff ects of urban 
sprawl, and conservatives, who focused on the social ills of the city. 
 Within Nixon’s inner circle, Daniel Patrick Moynihan personifi ed the 
connections between growing fears of an urban crisis, the drive for growth 
policy, and the broader population debate. Moynihan chaired the White 
House’s informal Urban Aff airs Council, and it was no coincidence that he 
subsequently spearheaded the population issue; indeed, aft er Nixon’s special 
message on population, Moynihan noted that “many of the points the Presi-
dent makes are closely linked to concerns of the Urban Aff airs Council.” 53 In 
a 1969  Public Interest article, “Toward a National Urban Policy,” Moynihan 
wrote: “Th e federal government must assert a specifi c interest in the move-
ment of people, displaced by technology or driven by poverty, from rural to 
urban areas, and also in the movement from densely populated central cities 
to suburban areas.” 54 
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 In his 1970 State of the Union address, Nixon called for a national “growth 
policy” to “create a new rural environment which will not only stem the migra-
tion to urban centers, but reverse it.” 55 Th e congressional drive for such a policy 
began with promise but ultimately failed, primarily because of the over-
whelming antipathy to government planning in the United States. 56 Yet although 
the question “Where will they live?” was embedded in an ultimately futile 
policy campaign, it exerted signifi cant infl uence over the course of the popula-
tion debate, defl ecting attention away from the traditional discourse centered 
on aggregate population growth, the economy, and the environment. Nixon 
explicitly moved toward the position that the “population problem” was pri-
marily one of location. According to historian J. Brooks Flippen, Nixon signed 
the 1970 Family Planning Act only reluctantly. “Concerned with conservative 
objections and now questioning whether the problem was distribution and not 
growth,” Flippen wrote, “Nixon initially resisted the new proposal.” 57 
 True, concerns about the geographic location of the population are com-
patible with a preference for a smaller aggregate population. Nevertheless we 
may reasonably conclude that within the Nixon White House, the demo-
graphic aspects of the “urban crisis” and the interest in population location 
crowded out the overpopulation critique. Moynihan, for example, vaguely 
approved of a slower aggregate rate of domestic population growth but 
advised Nixon to emphasize population redistribution away from the cities as 
the solution to the “population problem.” In February 1970, the president of 
the Sierra Club, Phillip Berry, met with Nixon and urged him to pursue ag-
gressive policies to promote national population stabilization. Moynihan fol-
lowed up with a letter to Berry that revealed the extent to which the White 
House defi ned the population issue in geographic terms. Th is letter is worth 
quoting at length:
 I certainly share your view that the growth of the world’s population, 
and the consequences of that growth, are among the most critical 
issues faced by mankind. I do believe we must distinguish between 
the problems of the developing nations, many of which are severely 
overcrowded by any measure, and those of the industrially advanced 
nations. In the United States the distribution of the population is at 
least as important as its absolute size. We are one of the least densely 
populated countries in the world and will likely remain so, with one 
of the slowest rates of growth. Yet we are highly concentrated, with a 
large majority of our people living on a small fraction of our land. In 
the past eight years one out of every three countries  lost population. 
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If this trend continues unattended, we shall become increasingly 
concentrated in the coming decades—our large metropolitan regions 
will become more congested while valuable rural areas continue to 
decline. It is for this reason that I believe we must plan now to ensure 
that future population growth, however large or small it may turn 
out to be, does not compound problems which already exist. 58 
 Nixon himself increasingly thought about the population issue in terms of 
the city, though his analysis of urban population growth contained more of 
the racial rhetoric that always hovers over population matters in the United 
States than it did concerns about urban planning. In a taped discussion with 
Ehrlichman about the commission, Nixon bluntly stated that many people 
thought about population control in terms of controlling the “Negro masses.” 
Aft er Nixon then suggested that individuals not using birth control “are the 
people that shouldn’t have kids,” the conversation immediately turned to 
Black migration patterns, and Nixon expressed wonderment that the African 
American population of San Francisco had reached 30 percent due to black 
in-migration and white fl ight. 59 Nixon’s casual racism here is not noteworthy. 
Th e point is that he thought about population in terms of the increasing con-
centration of Americans, and especially African Americans, in cities. Th ere is 
no evidence that Nixon saw the issue of population location as a way to divert 
attention from the question of aggregate growth (or as a way to create more 
conservative suburban voters!). Yet Nixon must have known that throughout 
the twentieth century, calls for government-sponsored population redistribu-
tion usually went nowhere, especially aft er the waning of the New Deal’s relo-
cation programs. And he likely knew that Malthusians deemed geographic 
redistribution a “dangerous pseudosolution to the population problem,” as 
Paul Ehrlich put it. 60 
 Not only the racial and geographic-distribution aspects of growth policy 
but also the evolving macroeconomic discourse surrounding it defl ated the 
overpopulation issue. Early in his tenure, President Nixon had fl irted, if not 
with anti-economic-growth thought, then at least with themes of balance and 
scarcity. “Th e time has come for a new quest,” Nixon stated in his 1970 State of 
the Union address: “a quest not for greater quantity of what we have, but for a 
new quality of life in America.” 61 By late 1970, however, in response to recession 
and the Left ’s assault on the growth ideal, Nixon returned to the robust celebra-
tion of economic growth that dominated the postwar political economy. 
Nixon’s retreat to growthism included a disdain for the zero population growth 
movement, which, he erroneously assumed, uniformly called for the cessation 
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of economic growth as well. In 1971, the president specifi cally told a group of 
environmentalists that he opposed zero population growth. 62 In part, this 
stance simply refl ected Nixon’s growing antipathy to environmentalism, which 
he had dismissed by telling the Sierra Club’s Berry that “All politics is a fad.” 63 
Nixon and his staff  also assumed that population growth and economic growth 
were concomitants—and thus that zero population growth would lead to un-
employment. Because of the perceived tight link between population and eco-
nomic growth, Nixon’s renewed emphasis on economic growth vitiated support 
for population control. 
 Nixon’s call for “balanced growth” continued to incorporate population 
concerns, but only the locational concerns stressed by the White House—not 
a slower rate of population growth or more stress on the quality of life. 64 Ac-
cordingly, Nixon’s bureaucracy combined the pursuit of balanced growth, 
couched in geographic terms, with a minimization of the overpopulation 
problem. In March 1970, Nixon’s National Goals Research Staff  (NGRS) 
reported internally that the United States could handle the population growth 
expected by the end of the century, even if the potential environmental eff ects 
were indeed worrisome. “Th ere is no present need for incentives to reduce 
population growth in the US,” the group concluded. 65 In its main report, 
 Toward Balanced Growth: Quantity with Quality , the NGRS argued that the 
“question of population size in the United States is not Malthusian” but rather 
one of paying the price for the problems created by affl  uence (“congestion 
and contamination”). Th e report also suggested that zero population growth 
would be achieved without any government action. It concluded that among 
the various decisions facing the nation on population, “One which appears 
not to be urgent is that of overall size of the population—even aft er the eff ects 
of a considerable amount of immigration are taken into account.” As for the 
question of population redistribution, however, the NGRS labeled it “a dif-
ferent matter, and one to be taken seriously regardless of what may be the 
upper limit of the population size.” Accordingly, the only population policies 
called for in  Toward Balanced Growth concerned geographic redistribution. 
Th e report advocated subsidizing population relocation to “alternate growth 
centers” and “new towns.” 66 
 Well before the Commission on Population Growth and the American 
Future issued its 1972 fi nal report, therefore, the Nixon White House had 
changed the tenor of the population issue. Its emphasis on the urban crisis 
put the question of population location ahead of the question of aggregate 
growth. No national population distribution policy emerged, and along the 
way Nixon rejected zero population growth doctrine. Th is rejection was in 
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some measure a reaction against the environmentalists who promoted the 
doctrine. Th e White House, however, was not simply recoiling against rad-
icalism. It was also increasingly imbibing a new celebration of population 
growth percolating among conservative economists. 
 toward a “market-knows-best” demography 
 In the 1930s, when the birthrate slumped in the industrialized nations and 
threatened to eventually snuff  out population growth, John Maynard Keynes 
famously argued that higher birthrates would spur economic recovery. 
During the 1930s, American economists sympathetic to Keynes’s broader 
anti–laissez-faire project developed a new demographic-economic doctrine 
that broke from Keynes on the specifi c question of population growth but still 
used Keynes’s new economics of consumption. Th e emergent doctrine, which 
I label Stable Population Keynesianism, held that Keynesian policies, espe-
cially the promotion of mass consumption, would render population growth 
economically irrelevant. Th e state, not the stork, would sustain economic 
growth, leaving society to enjoy the environmental and aesthetic benefi ts of a 
smaller population. 
 During the 1960s, Stable Population Keynesianism was eviscerated by 
the development of a basket of pro-population-growth and pro-market ideas 
that one scholar has termed “market-knows-best” demography. 67 Th is process 
was in step with the overall decline of Keynesianism in the United States. 
Market-knows-best demography was not the exclusive domain of conserva-
tives. But guided by the central laissez-faire premise that the invisible hand 
produces socially optimal results, the doctrine was constitutive of the polit-
ical “New Right” and the new classical economics that swept American poli-
tics in the 1970s. Indeed, market-knows-best demography articulated many 
themes amenable to the New Right’s worldview: faith in the market, the 
importance of innovation and entrepreneurship, and unabashed celebration 
of economic growth. Many leaders of the late twentieth-century conservative 
intellectual movement would subsequently draw on aspects of market-knows-
best demography. 
 Historians’ focus on the brief popular fascination with “population 
bomb” sentiment and the cultural battles that weakened the overpopulation 
critique has obscured the rising optimism regarding population growth that 
occurred concurrently—indeed previously. 68 Historians also generally paint 
the rise of population optimism as a counterattack against the zero popula-
tion growth movement. It was that, to be sure, but pro-population views 
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matured concurrently with the movement. Th rough the 1960s, anxiety about 
the economic consequences of population growth remained the norm among 
economists. A growing minority, however, expressed optimism about popu-
lation growth in both the developed and less-developed nations. Th eir market-
knows-best demography conceded that population growth can sometimes 
entail short-term costs (at least when rapid) but maintained that is usually a 
long-term net good. Market-knows-best demography boils down to fi ve 
propositions: fi rst, population growth creates economies of scale and hence 
economic growth. Second, demographic density propels innovation. Short-
term population pressure induces creative responses to maintain living stan-
dards, and higher population densities encourage the diff usion of information, 
technology, and skills; lower per capita infrastructure costs (for example, in 
transportation); and allow industries to reap the benefi ts of clustering. More-
over, more people equal more geniuses. Th ird, individual fertility decisions 
serve the common good. Fourth, even if a healthy economy amid a stable 
population is theoretically possible (as Stable Population Keynesianism 
insists), the state cannot be relied upon to make the necessary adjustments. 
Fift h, population growth advances human liberty. 
 Market-knows-best demography matured within four specialized debates. 
Th e fi rst, overlapping with the broader postwar evolution of economic growth 
theory, entailed a rejection of the previously prevailing idea that rapid popu-
lation growth in the developing world stunted incomes due to an excess of 
dependent children who drained savings into unproductive investment. 69 
During the 1960s, doubts emerged about whether high fertility produced the 
shortages of savings and capital purported by the pessimists, and optimists 
concluded that increased family size motivates families to positively change 
economic behavior. 70 
 Th e second specialized debate concerned natural resources. By the 1960s, 
many economists downgraded the importance of natural resources to mod-
ern skills-based economies and, separately, suggested that market forces ob-
viate resource scarcity. Th is debate revealed the developing links between 
modern conservative ideas and population optimism. For example, Friedrich 
Hayek, the Austrian economist who remains a hero to antistatist conserva-
tives, argued in  Th e Constitution of Liberty (1960) that natural resources could 
in fact become more plentiful. 71 In a classic cornucopian statement from 1963, 
two resource economists concluded, “Nature imposes particular scarcities, 
not an inescapable general scarcity.” 72 
 Also fostering a more optimistic posture toward population growth was 
the maturation of human-capital theory, which holds that investment in people, 
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via education, training, etc., unleashes economic growth. 73 Led by the Univer-
sity of Chicago’s Th eodore Schultz (also an offi  cial at the Population Council), 74 
human-capital theorists claimed that population growth promotes the expan-
sion of intermediary institutions (e.g., schools) that enhance human capital. 75 
Moreover, they insisted that the public investment necessitated by rapid 
population growth is not economic deadwood but in fact is contributive of 
economic growth. Schultz was not a conservative activist, but he espoused the 
basic tenets of the “Second Chicago School,” the vigorous advocates of limited 
government and markets who have reigned at the University of Chicago for 
the past half century. Schultz’s work on human-capital theory reveals not only an 
unexplored connection between the population debate and a major component 
of economic thought since the 1960s but also the affi  nities between population 
optimism and an unbridled faith in markets. 76 
 Th e fourth and fi nal debate concerned the microeconomics of fertility—
that is, not the  consequence s of population growth but its  causes . Here 
market-oriented economist-demographers argued that fertility decisions at 
the micro family level result in macro effi  ciencies for society. In short, they 
located an “invisible hand of fertility.” 77 Human-capital theorists, especially 
Chicago’s Gary Becker, Jacob Mincer, and Th eodore Schultz, were innovators 
of what economists oft en refer to as “new household economics.” 78 Th is school 
of thought did not have an immediate infl uence on the mainstream popula-
tion debate, but it would eventually provide an essential plank in pro-population-
growth thought. Th e central idea of the new household economics was that 
parents are rational actors who weigh the costs and benefi ts of having children. 
(The theory largely ignored the reality that the act of producing babies is 
usually pleasure, not work, and sometimes immune to rational calculation!) 
In particular, well-off  parents treat children as “consumer durable goods” that 
provide them with “psychic income.” Families thus increasingly prefer to have 
a few “high quality” children—those on whom they can lavish human capital, 
whether in the form of better education or piano lessons—rather than many 
“low quality” children. Higher incomes, in other words, translate into spoiled 
children, not additional siblings. 
 Since the 1960s, perhaps the single leading fi gure in the economics of 
American fertility has been the economist Richard Easterlin. Building on the 
consumption theories of Milton Friedman, the dean of the Chicago School—
above all, the argument that expected lifetime earnings, not immediate 
income, guide an individual’s consumption habits—Easterlin posited a cy-
clical theory of American fertility based upon “relative expectations” or 
“potential income.” In short, population growth rates naturally adjust to the 
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economic environment, a conclusion that cuts against concerns about over-
population. 79 Individual households rationally maximize their numbers of 
children, and the end result is a socially optimal population. True to the 
broader philosophy of the Chicago School, any externalities associated with 
children (e.g., pollution eff ects) were deemed marginal. 
 Apart from their work on fertility, the new household economists also 
praised the broader economic virtues of population growth. 80 And whether 
they focused on population growth’s inducement of harder work, technolog-
ical innovation, or reduced fertility, all the economists discussed in this sec-
tion stressed the motivations and initiative of the individual—a stress that 
dovetailed with the ascendant New Right’s stress on the entrepreneur. 81 Th is 
is not to say that market-knows-best demography became dominant in the 
late 1960s. A majority of economists remained convinced of population 
growth’s adverse capital-absorbing tendencies, and some even incorporated 
the metaphors from the new radical ecological economics. 82 Others rejected 
the assumptions of the new household economics. 83 Still, the rejection of 
market-knows-best demography increasingly came from an old guard of 
economist-demographers with links to the population movement. Just when 
population doomsdayism was enjoying its day in the sun, pro-population-
growth views were bubbling to the surface. 
 the conservative press and the population issue 
 Th e American business community and the business press were more favor-
able to Malthusian ideas during the late 1960s than is oft en assumed. 84 Some 
business leaders continued to espouse the traditional “chamber of commerce” 
view in favor of population growth (and implicitly the cheap labor they imag-
ined it engendered). Others, such as the retired CEOs serving on Planned 
Parenthood’s Commerce and Industry Committee, maintained that rapid 
population growth led to diminishing economic returns. 85 Even the CEO of 
the Gerber baby food company favored zero population growth, stating that 
his company was “not in the least alarmed at the possibilities of population 
limitation”! 86 Moreover, the business press off ered ample support for zero 
population growth. In June 1970, for example, the editors of  Fortune maga-
zine concluded that experts “tend to agree that the birth rate must drop if we 
are to avoid a ‘popullution’ problem.” 87 During the height of the population 
commission’s work, the  Wall Street Journal did express libertarian concerns 
about population policy, suggesting that Americans “ought also to talk about 
how the quality of life might be aff ected by, to take the extreme example, 
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having a computer or a bureaucrat decide who is and who is not allowed to 
have a child.” And yet the  Journal concluded, “It seems clear to us that some 
measures to limit population will be needed.” 88 
 Organs of the conservative movement were quicker to embrace the new 
pro-population-growth ideas. Conservative intellectuals had begun the 1960s 
supporting the general consensus that domestic population growth repre-
sented a challenge. Even before the formation of the commission in 1970, 
however, they had largely reversed course and adopted pro-population-
growth themes. Th e shift  can be clearly traced in the pages of the  National 
Review . 89 In 1965, William F. Buckley Jr. argued in the pages of his magazine 
that population growth was about to outstrip human ingenuity: “Solutions 
for today and tomorrow are perhaps not so diffi  cult to contrive—send trac-
tors to India, and hybrid corn to Egypt. But the day aft er tomorrow?” And 
Buckley warned his readers that the United States was not immune from the 
population dilemma. “Th e fact of the matter is that a solution must be found,” 
he wrote. “Th at old dog Malthus turned out to be very substantially correct in 
his dire predictions, and there seems to be no point in waiting until the United 
States is like India before moving in on the problem.” 90 Buckley was thus 
hopeful that the Catholic Church would reverse its position on birth 
control. 
 Also in 1965, the  National Review printed a supplement called “Th e Pop-
ulation Explosion,” which yielded nothing in apocalyptic rhetoric to the lib-
eral doomsday literature of the era. In the lead article, “Th e Avalanche,” as the 
editors summarized it, “A science fi ction novelist takes a hard look at the 
earth’s skyrocketing birthrate and admits it portends horrors even he fi nds 
hard to imagine.” 91 Th e author identifi ed as the true science fi ction of the era 
the food optimism promulgated by the “nutritional technological cohorts—
the algae-and-yeast boys, the ranch-the-oceans fellows, and the transmuta-
tion-of-petrochemicals-into-proteins enthusiasts.” 92 “Th e Avalanche” also 
proff ered the typical Cold War–inspired, libertarian argument against popu-
lation growth: that it would engender big government and Sovietize the 
United States. “Th e very presence of these new masses of humanity [in the 
United States], the weight of their parents’ votes and, so soon, their own, 
makes bigger bureaucracy—bigger Big Brother bureaucracy—so probable 
that without a miracle it is a certainty.” 93 Another article in the supplement, 
meanwhile, affi  rmed the traditional view that population growth stunted cap-
ital formation and economic growth. 94 
 Yet just a few years later, even as the population scare achieved critical 
mass, the  National Review rejected the overpopulation critique and printed 
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the conservative economists who argued that population growth expanded 
the market—and that the market would solve any ecological dilemmas. Th ese 
included the Australian economist Colin Clark, an early critic of the prevail-
ing wisdom regarding economic development who argued that the world 
could feed at least 40 billion people. Clark maintained that technological in-
novation was a function of population. 95 And he reached deep into the intel-
lectual toolkit of populationists, articulating the militaristic and mercantilist 
view that the U.S. needed continual population growth to remain a world 
power. 96 Further, Clark argued that population expansion enhanced liberty. 
In contrast, Clark contended, nations with stable populations had less 
mobility and freedom and more expensive government. 97 
 Milton Friedman, one of the leading economists of the American neolib-
eral revival, echoed the notion that population growth not only grew the 
economy but also reduced the size of government. In a 1970  National Review 
piece on the new environmentalism, Friedman wrote, “[Th e] growth of pop-
ulation and improvements in transportation and communication have greatly 
widened the scope for eff ective competition and so have reduced the need for 
governmental concern with monopolist behavior.” 98 One fi nal example of the 
new libertarian embrace of population growth came from Robert Moses, the 
famous urban planner who did more than any other to build (and some say 
ruin) modern New York City. By the 1960s, Moses was out of favor with the 
establishment, and he turned against the New Left  and its social planners 
with vigor. Failing to recognize that the vast majority in the population move-
ment embraced a laissez-faire approach to population, in the sense that they 
had no more ambitious goal than eliminating unwanted fertility, Moses wrote 
in the  National Review : “Th e planners already predict drastic regulation of 
the population by law to insure a future stable, comfortable, balanced society 
and economy. Th is consummation will be arrived at on the basis of scientifi c, 
impartial, unbiased study of long-haired, bewhiskered, sideburned experts 
who will of course be completely divorced from politics.” 99 
 Proponents of population control continued to argue that population 
growth eroded freedom. 100 Nevertheless, conservatives, who increasingly 
captured the discussion of “liberty” in the United States, eff ectively built a 
libertarian case in favor of population growth. Th eir views represented a shift  
from the 1950s and 1960s, when many conservatives argued that population 
growth would lead to Big Government. And if Moynihan’s case is indicative, 
it seems that many liberals drift ing rightward toward neoconservatism were 
similarly unimpressed by the possibility of state-directed demographic man-
agement. Appearing on “Face the Nation” in early 1970, Moynihan noted that 
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“[t]here is no government in history that has ever had any eff ect whatever on 
population.” He continued, “One of the nice things about people is that they 
don’t pay too much attention to Government . . . particularly with respect to 
the number of children they have.” 101 
 nixon spurns the population commission 
 It is against the backdrop of this inchoate conservative critique of the (over)
population issue that we return to the dénouement of this issue in the Nixon 
years. Th e interim report released by the Commission on Population Growth 
and the American Future, in March 1971, was well received in the press and 
stirred few feathers in the administration. 102 Th at summer, Sen. Tydings (who 
had just lost his seat) and Milton Eisenhower launched a group called the 
Coalition for a National Population Policy, and lawmakers continued to 
advocate a resolution calling for population stabilization. 103 However, the ad-
ministration was increasingly thinking about the population issue in terms of 
geographic redistribution and the urban crisis, and the president specifi cally 
rejected the goal of zero population growth. Abortion politics were becoming 
more salient, and according to the  National Journal , doomed the population 
stabilization resolution fl oating in Congress. 104 In addition, the conservatives 
in the White House would have been aware of conservative intellectuals’ 
growing disdain for population control. 
 Th e contours of the commission’s fi nal report,  Population and the 
American Future , were well known before its offi  cial release in the spring of 
1972. As it argued that population stabilization would yield environmental 
and modest economic benefi ts, 105  Population and the American Future called 
for a series of antinatalist policies. 106 Th ese included population and sex edu-
cation in schools, the liberalization of abortion laws, passage of the Equal 
Rights Amendment, more access to contraception, and stepped-up enforce-
ment of existing immigration restrictions. 107 In addition, the commission 
proposed a series of measure to promote the geographic redistribution of 
the American population. 108 
 Initially, the White House and the commission each sought to control the 
diff usion of the commission’s fi ndings. 109 During March and April, however, 
the Nixon administration moved toward outright rejection of the body, stone-
walling Rockefeller’s designs for a successful launch of  Population and the 
American Future . 110 To be sure, abortion politics were central to the White 
House’s posture and the ultimate “fi asco” surrounding the commission’s fi nal 
report. 111 Th e scholarly emphasis on abortion politics, however, belies the 
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importance of several other factors surrounding the White House’s treatment 
of the commission, including the new conservative economic ideas about 
population growth and intra–Republican Party politics. 
 In March, the White House debated a full range of options for respond-
ing to the commission’s fi nal report—from issuing no response at all to 
praising but dissenting on the abortion issue to attacking on all fronts. 112 At 
least two teams draft ed the president’s potential statement upon receiving 
 Population and the American Future . One was written by Ray Waldmann, a 
White House staff er, and David Gergen, the longtime editor of  US News & 
World Report, who served as an adviser to presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, 
and Clinton. Th e Waldmann-Gergen draft  praised the commission for its 
work, insisted that “questions related to population and economic growth are 
among my [the president’s] concerns,” encouraged further dialogue on popu-
lation matters, and reaffi  rmed support for the Equal Rights Amendment. But 
it stressed the president’s fi rm opposition to “unrestricted abortion rights.” 113 
Th e other draft  was written by Patrick Buchanan, the conservative television 
commentator and sometime candidate for president who was then a young 
Nixon speechwriter. 114 
 More than anyone in the Nixon White House, Buchanan seems to have 
engaged the new pro-population-growth economics and the libertarian cri-
tique of population control. Buchanan did still assume that rapid population 
growth would place a “drain upon limited economic and material resources.” 
He thus pointed to the moderating birthrate—not pro-population-growth 
theorists—to label “a chimera” the idea that “the American people are in dan-
ger of procreating themselves into poverty.” Profi ting from the new conserva-
tive toolkit of population ideas, however, Buchanan also cast doubt on the 
entire basket of economic assumptions guiding the population commission. 
He wrote that “the central conclusion of the commission—that there is 
nothing to gain from an expanding population—is clearly open to challenge. 
Just as the commission has enumerated arguments for this novel view—so 
powerful arguments can be marshaled on behalf of its antithesis.” Elsewhere 
in this draft  Buchanan wrote, “Malthusian specters, like the old soldier of the 
barracks ballad, as oft en as not just fade away.” 
 Th e Buchanan draft  directly challenged several other recommendations 
of the population commission. It argued that the federal government should 
assume no role in sex education, and it stated that Nixon was “utterly op-
posed to abortion.” Buchanan also cleverly tried to steal the “quality of life” 
argument back from opponents of population growth. He argued that while 
one child might promote happiness for some people, “To other middle- or 
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lower-income couples from religious or ethnic or racial minorities, the good 
life may reside in many children and few material possessions.” Finally, the 
Buchanan draft  tried to marginalize the Rockefeller commission. It thanked 
the group for beginning a national conversation about population but sug-
gested that it had off ered “deeply controversial recommendations.” It also 
averred that in a sprawling democracy, population issues were too important 
to be decided by a commission or even by the president. 115 
 Nixon’s growing disdain for the commission and the population issue—
and support for the Buchanan position—was evident in the days leading up 
to the publication of the fi nal report. In a conversation with Ehrlichman on 
March 30, 1972, Nixon said that Buchanan was the only one capable of writing 
a speech “to kick that population commission in the ass.” Th e new political 
calculus surrounding abortion was principal here. Nixon summed up the 
issue this way: “Th ose who vote for abortion, except for a few fanatics, are 
not going to vote for Nixon because he comes out for abortion. Th ose who are 
against abortion, however, feel so strongly about it from a moral standpoint 
that they sure as hell will vote against Nixon because of that issue.” Ehrlich-
man echoed the president’s reasoning: “Th e people that are pushing for zero 
population growth, like the Sierra Club and others, are never going to be pro-
Nixon. . . . Th e people who are off ended by abortion can be won over.” 116 
 Nixon’s observations came amid a public relations battle between anti-
abortion Catholic leaders and the proabortion forces marshaled by Rocke-
feller and the population lobby. On March 15, the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference excoriated the commission for walking into an “Ideological 
Valley of Death.” Rockefeller, for his part, met with Catholic leaders, secured 
the support of the Protestant National Council of Churches, and had his allies 
at major newspapers write favorable editorials about the commission. Critch-
low’s account of the politics surrounding the population commission con-
vincingly suggests that Nixon’s accurate assessment of abortion politics circa 
1972 and his trepidation about supporting the commission were both part of 
his developing “Catholic Strategy” to win reelection in 1972. 117 
 Apart from the abortion issue, Nixon also voiced his disdain for the gen-
eral antigrowth thrust of the population movement. In a conversation with 
Henry Kissinger on March 31, Nixon brought up the recently published Mal-
thusian bestseller  Th e Limits to Growth , which he referred to as the “MIT 
computer study.” (Th e book used a crude computer and even cruder analysis 
of variables such as the food supply and energy use to predict the collapse of 
world systems within a century.) “What is the reason, Henry,” Nixon asked, 
“for the total negativism of people in the intellectual community? What in the 
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heck is the reason for it? May I ask why? You know these people well.” 118 
At the same time, Nixon’s economic advisers were embracing pro-population-
growth positions. For example, Hendrick Houthakker, one of the economists 
on Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisers, downplayed overpopulation in a 
speech at American University and called population control a “simple-
minded idea” and a “panacea.” “As far as I am aware,” Houthakker maintained, 
“it has not been demonstrated that there exists any close casual relation 
between the growth of per capita gross national product and the growth of 
population, and there is no obvious reason why there should be. Th e use of 
facile biological analogies obscures the fact that man is a producer as well as 
a consumer.” 119 
 Nixon chose the milder response to the commission, but the tapes reveal 
that he would have preferred the much stronger Buchanan draft  that force-
fully refuted the economic logic of population pessimists. Th is is not to say 
that Nixon came to a great intellectual awakening aft er reading social science 
or the  National Review . His turn against population control partially refl ected 
a perception that radical environmentalists supported the cause, not a well-
formed theory about the benefi ts of population growth. And the decision to 
soft -pedal the rejection of the commission resulted in part from a desire to 
appease Nelson Rockefeller, the powerful Republican governor of New York 
and brother of John D. Rockefeller III—or, more precisely, to appease the 
liberal, eastern, Rockefeller wing of the Republican Party. On April 3, 1972, 
Nixon and Ehrlichman discussed the potential results of issuing Buchanan’s 
strong statement. Ehrlichman informed the president that in his many con-
versations with Nelson Rockefeller, the latter had frequently expressed his 
appreciation of the White House for appointing his brother chair of the com-
mission. Ehrlichman told Nixon that it was “as if Nelson were trying to fi nd 
some healthy activity for his brother.” Ehrlichman noted that “the proposal 
that’s coming to you is that you blast them out of the water.” He confi ded, 
however, “I’m awfully afraid of the eff ect on our relationship with Nelson if 
we tee off  on this commission.” Th e president agreed, suggesting that they 
“treat with kid gloves” all issues other than abortion. 120 
 Th e Commission on Population Growth and the American Future issued 
its majority report on March 27, 1972. Th e White House delayed comment, 
during which time the taped conversations just described took place. Th e delay 
prompted several pleading letters from John D. Rockefeller III, who sensed cor-
rectly that Catholic leaders were pressuring the White House to denounce the 
report. 121 On May 5, Nixon released his offi  cial statement, which, aft er bland 
words of thanks, included the now-familiar statement against unrestricted 
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abortion rights (as well as against contraception for adolescents). 122 Th at same 
day, Nixon greeted Rockefeller and several members of the commission at the 
White House, but he failed to invite them to sit on the Oval Offi  ce sofa, as was 
customary on such occasions. 123 During this polite but perfunctory meeting, 
Nixon asked questions only about overseas population growth. 124 
 Nixon’s statement eff ectively tabled the issue of domestic population 
growth. Th e White House did form an interagency task force to study the 
commission’s fi nding. 125 But it blocked the distribution of a fi lm the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services had made on population issues and 
refused to participate in a network television documentary on the commis-
sion called “Doom or Boom,” which aired in January 1973. 126 It was thus anti-
climactic when the task force’s chair wrote the White House that the 
“Commission’s primary recommendation, namely ‘that the nation welcome 
and plan for a stable population’ seems premature and is not adequately sup-
ported by the arguments set forth in the report.” 127 
 conclusion 
 An unrecognized irony of the population maelstrom in the Nixon years is that 
even as the White House rejected the Commission on Population Growth and 
the American Future, this body was turning away from the prevailing overpop-
ulation critique. Put another way, the commission was historically signifi cant 
not only as an initial skirmish in the culture wars but also because it provided 
evidence of—and in part faltered because of—the progress of pro-population-
growth thought. In particular, some of the major studies commissioned by the 
commission undercut population alarmism. One study undertaken by the 
think tank Resources for the Future, for example, concluded that population 
growth would play only a minor role in determining pollution levels over the 
next thirty to fi ft y years compared to technological development and govern-
ment resource policy. And a majority of papers published by the commission 
that served as the basis for a conference at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research cut against the overpopulation paradigm that had launched the com-
mission. 128 Building on the expertise described in this article, these papers 
insisted that continued population growth would spur entrepreneurship, new 
knowledge, and technological innovation; increase savings (and hence invest-
ment) while increasing consumption; augment economies of scale; create a 
more productive labor force; and foster optimism in the future. 129 
 Allen Kelley, who would emerge in the 1970s as a leading “revisionist” eco-
nomic demographer, actually switched from an anti- to a pro-population-growth 
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position in the course of his commission-sponsored research. Th is left  him, as he 
put it, “in an uncomfortable position” of rejecting the basic intellectual premise 
of the commission’s work. As Kelly saw it, “Th e population problem as com-
monly conceived—too many people—may be a non-problem.” 130 Commenting 
on Kelley’s about-face, Richard Easterlin wrote, “Kelley’s experience is represen-
tative, I think, of that of many of us who have tried to look into the arguments 
and evidence of the ‘population problem.’” 131 
 Population and the American Future did argue that slowing the rate of 
population growth would yield macroeconomic benefi ts. And yet growing un-
certainty regarding the deleterious eff ects of population growth seems to have 
produced an important shift  in perspective. Instead of bemoaning the costs of 
continued demographic expansion, commission members were more comfort-
able challenging critics to explain why more people would be benefi cial. 
Research director Charles Westoff  put it this way: “Th e ‘costs’ of the most likely 
magnitudes of population growth for the U.S. to the year 2000 will probably not 
add up to an overwhelming case for a national population policy aimed at 
achieving ZPG as soon as possible. . . . One change in the frame of reference 
that might fi nesse these diffi  culties is to try to shift  the burden of proof to ques-
tion the argument that increasing the rate of growth or continuing current rates 
of growth are desirable.” 132 In its letter transmitting its fi nal report to Congress, 
the commission adopted this strange posture of pointing out the lack of future 
benefi ts rather than tallying present or future costs: “Aft er two years of concen-
trated eff ort, we have concluded that, in the long run, no substantial benefi ts 
will result from further growth of the Nation’s population, rather that the 
gradual stabilization of our population through voluntary means would con-
tribute signifi cantly to the Nation’s ability to solve its problems. We have looked 
for, and have not found, any convincing economic argument for continued 
population growth.” 133 Privately, Rockefeller seemed perplexed that this was the 
strongest language a commission created to study the population crisis could 
muster. “Sort of backdoor approach,” he scribbled across a draft . 134 
 Regardless of these subtle distinctions, the commission’s moderate (and 
increasingly challenged) arguments in favor of slowing population growth, as 
well as its stress on population redistribution, were caught between rejuve-
nated economic neoliberalism on the Right and population doomsdayism on 
the Left . Th e Commission on Population Growth and the American Future—
and the “center” of the population debate that it embodied—was stillborn 
even before Nixon dismissed its fi nal report. 
 Kansas State University 
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